So yeah, it was just compromised internal credentials with the ability to take over user accounts. This is a big no-no and clearly the controls around those internal tools were woefully inadequate. This points to deficient security culture inside Twitter.https://twitter.com/TwitterSupport/status/1283591848729219073 …
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But support tools? There should be high-level overrides for all of that stuff, and auditing up the wazoo, at the very least a kill switch that is always accessible to on-call engineers/security team. It should've taken minutes to identify and lock out the attack.
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There is absolutely no reason why anything someone working for Twitter support does shouldn't be immediately identifiable, controllable, and reversible by someone at a higher level, on-call, as soon as it happens. We have access hierarchies for a reason.
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It is not clear that this was a support account that was accessed rather than an engineering account. Engineers often have access to support tools, especially if they are responsible for them.
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Possible, but it's getting far-fetched. Whoever did this was clearly an idiot and didn't think through the consequences of their actions. Engineers are less likely to attempt something this dumb, IME.
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