So, the problem with USB tokens that we basically have two choices: - Unauditable black boxes built on *supposedly* more secure ICs that require NDAs to develop for - Open and auditable, but definitely pwnable off the shelf microcontrollers. Which poison do you prefer?
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Keep in mind that this depends on your use case, e.g. a key keeping SSH keys needs to be more secure than a key used for FIDO U2F login for a handful of websites, because the latter is a second factor only and easier to revoke/replace.
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Also keep in mind that open does not mean secure, I've seen some absolutely abysmal firmware in "open" firmware projects along these lines too. I guess what I'm asking is whether it's worth doing #2 "right" with the caveat of being vulnerable to physical attacks.
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What about the Nordic offerings? https://www.nordicsemi.com/Software-and-Tools/Development-Kits/nRF52840-Dongle … seems like a good alternative to any random STM32 for this kind of application.
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Looks like that has some nice crypto accelerator stuff, but it doesn't mention any kind of hardware hardening. I'm not sure if it's substantially better; maybe it helps a bit with secret extraction *if* you use a battery backup?
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You don't need to "hope", there are active mitigation to physical attack vectors.
@Trezor actively promotes using passphrase, which can give you measurable protection against physical threats (in contrast to just hope and trust in case of SE).https://blog.trezor.io/is-your-passphrase-strong-enough-d687f44c63af … -
Ideally you have *both* physical attack mitigations *and* a strong passphrase that cryptographically wraps your private key.
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