To clarify the Windows crypto fail: The problem isn't in signature validation. The problem is the *root store/cache*. CryptoAPI considers an (attacker-supplied) root CA to be in the trust store if its public key and serial match a cert in the root store, Ignoring curve params.
TBF you can do the same thing for RSA if you set e=1, but I assume they *do* consider the RSA pubkey to be e,N and not just N (or at least they reject e=1 elsewhere).
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Many theys :/
Thanks. Twitter will use this to make your timeline better. UndoUndo
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In most RSA implementations I've seen, "e" is described as/considered part of the public key, even though it's almost always fixed as 65537 these days, but curve params are not considered part of the ECDSA public key but rather a separate thing.
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It's frequently something other than 65537 for tor hidden services. I think OpenSSH has a different default value as well. Never seen it not considered part of the public key.
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