To clarify the Windows crypto fail: The problem isn't in signature validation. The problem is the *root store/cache*. CryptoAPI considers an (attacker-supplied) root CA to be in the trust store if its public key and serial match a cert in the root store, Ignoring curve params.
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Huh! I was thinking this reminded me of the ancient critical bit bug, and was trying to find the details of it (been a while!) and I found this *other* bug. https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/publications/conference-paper/1996/10/22/proceedings-of-the-19th-nissc-1996/documents/paper075/paper.pdf …
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TBF you can do the same thing for RSA if you set e=1, but I assume they *do* consider the RSA pubkey to be e,N and not just N (or at least they reject e=1 elsewhere).
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