Well, regardless of exploitability, this attitude just destroyed any confidence I had in VLC's updater being secure. Seriously, WTF. https://trac.videolan.org/vlc/ticket/21737 …
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Replying to @marcan42
There is a reddit post about this, Someone mentioned that the update is signed and checked against a harcoded value in VLC... They also mentioned something about http being cache able? Sounds to me they use the same method as apt for verification.
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Replying to @Zer0xFF
Which isn't a particularly good one, because it's subject to downgrade attacks. HTTPS fixes that. Also apparently the key is 1024-bit dsa, which, like, what.
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VLC updater forbids downgrades.
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Does it do it securely? Even if it does (big if), nothing can forbid upgrades to a vulnerable-not-latest version. That is fixed by HTTPS.
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It is not fixed by HTTPS. It ALSO requires changes to the update mechanism to achieve this. Which requires the transition to a new update model, which is not simple.
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Of course it's fixed by HTTPS. If you use HTTPS, I can't serve any updates at all without compromising your server. I can only block the process altogether, which is not upgrade-to-vulnerable.
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No, it is not. It solves the update information being accurate, but not the full update issue.
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It fixes the exact two scenarios I mentioned, and generally speaking fixes all attack scenarios involving a basic network MITM on updates other than plain denial-of-updates (which is not fixable).
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