Alright look with all the side channel discourse happening again I just need to say it: modern silicon design is fucking hard, as is security in general. At the risk of sounding like an Intel shill: chill the hell out. There is a lot more to this than a lot of you realize.
I mean, we all know antivirus doesn't work. Reactive technologies are great and all, but how would you fundamentally distinguish malicious behavior from normal operation besides known signatures?
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I mean, if this idea worked, and leaving aside CPU side channels for a second, we'd all be running our OSes inside VMs with a hypervisor looking for compromise already. It would have similar visibility into what the guest is doing.
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Antivirus does not work because programmers don't code for it. If control loops were inherently part of the execution/data plane, developers would just provide the required parametrization. See app sandboxes and web API authentication: alive and kicking.
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I am similarly lost as to the how, but I’m given the impression that it is already employed in some high security environments. I was once told in avionics systems the working assumption is an attacker is already inside, and may have rooted one of the computers onboard.
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The implication being multiple systems would filter each other’s data, identify strange behavior, and restart each other as required. I don’t think it’s easy or efficient, but like most attacks we gauge risk and acessabulity to the surface when we craft countermeasures.
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