We're at a turning point now where people are realizing that there's a whole new entire class of attack surface. This happens at least once every five years recently, and tbh it will get worse before it gets better.
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Its hard to thwart an attack or shore up an attack surface you don't even know exists, and hindsight is 20/20. This shit may seem obvious now, but it took a lot of thinkers a lot of time to get here. The thing to do now is think about new, safer paradigms for moving forward.
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Instead of adding to security theater noise and calling out specific groups, try to realize that this is not the fault of a specific company, it is the result of an industry filled with brilliance rushing to be the fastest.
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Now the silicon industry knows that can't work. Instead of continuing to jump down each other's throats, try to think of ways to shift towards better, safer systems at the architecture level.
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Replying to @hedgeberg
Forget Spectre, if you want a better picture of how silicon and hardware vendors treat product security go look at the ME, PSP, BIOS, and BMC bugs from the past year. TL,DR - they haven't been trying very hard.
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Replying to @syncsrc
You missed the point. A lot of those aren't silicon flaws, I'm talking specifically about silicon side channels, but even if they were that kind of attitude doesn't help anyone. As I said, security is hard, and pretending its not just makes you blind to the challenges.
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Replying to @hedgeberg
SEV isn't broken because of side-channel attacks that weren't understood until 6 months ago. Ditto the architectual/Si issues in the ME. I see HW/Si issues on a monthly basis, and almost none of them are novel.
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Replying to @syncsrc
You're still missing the point. There are a lot of hardware vulns out there, I know the majority are not side channels. I'm only talking about side channels here, see: "whole new attack surface". Theres a lot to be said for vendor flaws but that's not what I'm talking about here.
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Replying to @hedgeberg
Assigning blame here is hard. Si vendors knew about side channels but repeatedly disregarded and downplayed the threat, and underfunded security in general. No one will ever know if Spectre could have been prevented, but the industry didn't even try.
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Replying to @syncsrc @hedgeberg
In fact, they designed entire new security infrastructure that fundamentally depended on the absence of side channels. With potentially catastrophic consequences if it gets widely adopted and broken.
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SGX aside, nevermind virtualization and the whole cloud craze. Not all side channels are created equal. There's a reason nobody but Intel is vulnerable to L1TF. Nobody in their right mind would think short-circuiting EPT is ever okay, even if you're in speculation.
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Replying to @marcan42 @matthew_d_green and
I get that the industry wasn't really on the ball on this one, but there's a pretty massive difference between Spectre v1 (a fundamental security issue with speculation that affects the whole industry) and L1TF (Intel what the fuck are you doing?), other bugs being in the middle.
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Replying to @marcan42 @matthew_d_green and
This sounds like no vendor had a proper security team evaluating these kinds of side channels, but on top of that it seems Intel likely had an explicit policy of "literally anything goes before instructions retire, no matter how insane", which is crazy.
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