Lessons learned: with a dynamic and reactive opponent with development resources and ops staff, a focus onstatic IOCs is an ancient philosophy stuck in the last decade. An attentive opponent will fix them before you can deploy detection.
Ultimately, we need a smoking gun. Smoking guns are *not* difficult to find. It's easy to avoid raising alarms on an automated system. It's quite hard to avoid raising suspicion on a personal computer. It's basically impossible to hide if someone is *looking* for the malware.
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To put it another way: if BadBIOS were real and affected hardware I own, and I had strong belief that I was compromised by such a piece of software (or even a hardware implant), I am confident I would be able to gather hard, irrefutable evidence of such within a few days.
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The fact that Dragos has not done so, and has not provided any evidence that would qualify as a smoking gun, hypothetically *could* be a sign of an unimaginably, incomprehensibly advanced series of implants and an active attacker... but occam's razor says he's just seeing things.
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