This is one area where the modelled capital requirement is quite a lot lower than the standardized, because if you aren't capable of getting a model approved, you arguably shouldn't be doing this kind of business at all in any size. CFDs just treated as exposure to the underlying
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so basically the capital requirement is whatever the notional is, and if you hedge via buying the stock, it's zero? no counterparty surcharge?
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I have tried to avoid counterparty credit risk my whole life because it is hellish complicated but I suspect there should be some capital requirement for it here, basically because what is happening today is an utterly predictable risk.
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especially funny because the lads at GS and DB appear to have made out without any material losses versus 2 yards at Nomura and something material at CS/UBS.
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Replying to @pearkes @dsquareddigest and
Vandy, C. A. 🇺🇦 ✊🏼 Retweeted macrocephalopod
this might be only tangentially related to the question but fwiw this was helpful in understanding the mechanics, which lead me to believe the only thing out of the norm was the amount of leverage Hwang used, + insufficient/wrong hedgehttps://twitter.com/macrocephalopod/status/1376431761169788933?s=20 …
Vandy, C. A. 🇺🇦 ✊🏼 added,
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Thanks. The wrong hedge would - hopefully - have shown up in their own risk measures. But wouldn’t for the PBs: they’re perfectly hedged on each side.
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macrocephalopod Retweeted macrocephalopod
I tagged some stuff from others onto the end which specifically talks about counterparty risk and hedges for that (though tbh it is hard to hedge your cpty risk against a private entity that doesn't explicitly issue debt, you can't buy CDS on them)https://twitter.com/macrocephalopod/status/1376529068720599042?s=20 …
macrocephalopod added,
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Replying to @macrocephalopod @CAVandy and
You deal with the counterparty risk as a prime broker by taking excess cash collateral in a separate account I think.
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Replying to @dsquareddigest @CAVandy and
Yeah, and this is good for like 99.99% of cases but in the 0.01% you find you have a fuckton of wrong way risk and you're out $2bn+
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My guess is, part of what went wrong at Nomura/CS is not realizing that they were one of at least 4-5 swap counterparties (and not the biggest) and as a result not holding enough collateral and not acting quickly enough when shit hit the fan
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Replying to @macrocephalopod @dsquareddigest and
I like the idea that "the Federation" at GS (the divisions that watch over risk, compliance etc) may have saved the day by writing in higher margin requirements and more closely monitoring when/if ISDA clauses were triggered nerds rule! = a good look
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Replying to @CAVandy @macrocephalopod and
I just don't understand why anyone looking at this would say anything other than "Bill, we are happy to run a $200m spread betting account for an eccentric multi-millionaire, but we do not take the risk of a $15bn spread betting account for an eccentric multi-billionaire"
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