The German model optimized for a particular kind of productivity. Small-medium firms, Mittelstand, specialize in high-value manufacturing exports, aided by favorable monetary policy. Meanwhile, the $billion companies Germany produced in the last decade can be counted on one hand
-
Show this thread
-
As Peter Thiel recently observed, the German model embodies not a fear of failure, but a fear of success. The "social market" is not cut out for the 21st century. HT
@danwwang https://www.weltwoche.ch/ausgaben/2018-29/artikel/en-hypnotische-massenphanomene-die-weltwoche-ausgabe-29-2018.html …pic.twitter.com/3usqwg7VgI
2 replies 0 retweets 5 likesShow this thread -
Thiel cites the decision of Facebook's board to not sell to Yahoo. The cliché (but still valid) example is Apple — Could Steve Jobs have turned Apple around in the context of co-determination?pic.twitter.com/b9WQffcpJv
3 replies 2 retweets 6 likesShow this thread -
Speaking of cliché, in his defense of Warren's bill Vox's
@mattyglesias goes on at length arguing against Milton Friedman's argument for shareholder profit maximization. Yet Friedman is a bogeyman. Corporations have many motives, not simply max{short term shareholder value}.pic.twitter.com/tze3UfHkqK
1 reply 0 retweets 5 likesShow this thread -
Fortunately, the fight between shareholder primacy and "stakeholder theory" is a false dichotomy. There are other perspectives in business ethics, including my favorite: "The market-failures approach"pic.twitter.com/IcLF4qbmFl
2 replies 0 retweets 3 likesShow this thread -
Stakeholder theory has many well known problems. If we instead recognize why shareholder corporations exist in the first place — that they're highly efficient organizational forms — then we can situate the law enabling corporate governance in terms of solving market failures.pic.twitter.com/fs5aK4OhCQ
1 reply 0 retweets 3 likesShow this thread -
This public policy view of corporate governance is descendent from Ronald Coase's famous theory of the firm, which Henry Hansmann translated into business ethics:https://www.academia.edu/249181/The_Hansmann_Argument_for_Shareholder_Primacy …
1 reply 0 retweets 1 likeShow this thread -
As Volkswagen's sex-for-votes scandal revealed, co-determination doesn't obviate the need firms often have for unified formal control by shareholders. It seems Coase's theory drives a hard bargain
pic.twitter.com/dpQOIA8WAj
1 reply 1 retweet 2 likesShow this thread -
In sum, opposing Warren's "Accountable Capitalism Act" plan is not about "socialism vs capitalism". It's about preserving the thing that makes America the greatest place in the world to scale an idea into a billion dollar business: The central role for visionaries.pic.twitter.com/WMIS5uQItX
4 replies 2 retweets 7 likesShow this thread -
Replying to @hamandcheese
Is it possible that our large firms have more to do with 1) our large contiguous market size and 2) that we have institutional capital (like pensions/endowments that have to deploy/manage large pools of capital) while the German pension system is more pay-as-you-go which means
1 reply 0 retweets 2 likes
They don’t have the same LP base to support a whole range of firms that engage in riskier investments like venture?
-
-
Replying to @kimmaicutler
Differences in the depth of capital markets is also a huge factor, yes. Not mono-causal.
1 reply 0 retweets 0 likes -
Replying to @hamandcheese @kimmaicutler
I hereby dub you two the "intellectual dark wonk." Soon: debates in stadiums.
0 replies 0 retweets 0 likes
End of conversation
New conversation -
Loading seems to be taking a while.
Twitter may be over capacity or experiencing a momentary hiccup. Try again or visit Twitter Status for more information.