Kendra Schaefer 凯娜

Problem with government model: China's (social) credit model goes against international credit norms, and will make it difficult for China to link up to international credit standards. He also notes it "has opened us up to international attacks and misunderstandings."

Also, government-driven credit systems are expensive, resource-intensive, and require constant top-down pressure to develop.

Problems with market-driven credit models: use cases are much more narrow, in that they can only really assess financial risk, they cannot double as a tool of social governance.

Also, market-driven credit systems arise organically. China's market-driven credit services are too far behind developed countries, and too urgently needed, to be allowed to develop on their own.

His conclusions: 1. China is trying to create a hybrid government / market credit model, but at the moment, the government participation in the SCS is choking out market participation. Policymakers should now focus on developing the market side of the SCS.

2. China's modern SCS has deviated too far from its roots, and has too many use cases. It is now being used to: improve social honesty, support lending risk assessments, promote judicial integrity, clean up gov and biz environments. It should be segmented into discrete systems.

I'm interested to see how closely the next social credit planning directive (due out pretty soon, now) aligns with Lin's recommendations. Have the architects of China's SCS lost control of their baby? Or will Chinese policymakers also pull back and majorly re-assess?

How much of the development of either system is down to lack of technology to implement the ideas, and how much closer is it now? To me it seems like combing systems makes sense, someone just needs to work out how to do it and no one is better placed than China to do so