An unoccupied position in logical space: absences are conscious. Right now, there is no trash can in my office. The absence of this trash can is itself conscious—at least that’s the idea. If absences have causal powers, why can’t they be conscious?
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relations), so why not say they’re conscious too? But then, a second, distinct line of argument emerged in the thread. It says: suppose we are functionalists about consciousness. Well, absences should be able to occupy the functional roles of conscious properties, in which case
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either absences should count as realizers of consciousness (and perhaps token absences are identical with conscious events), or (depending on what kind of functionalist you are) absence properties should be identical with conscious properties.
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