Very nice paper.
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Can you tell which special interest groups they are leaning towards (and hence what is creating the moral hazard problem)? Is it ones that are giving them jobs after they leave office? Funding their campaigns? Giving their spouses sinecure positions?...?
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We use campaign donations to for connections between representatives and special interests. That's not to say that these other kinds of "goodies" don't matter, we just don't have good data on them.
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You see more of an effect for one party than another? (Perhaps one party more beholden to less palatable special interests?)
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Or any evidence this is only a thing for unpalatable special interests? (Have a way of measuring that? Presumably fine to be good to veterans, even if everyone is watching.)
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Unfortunately, we don't have much statistical power do comparative statics. At this point, the answer is "I don't know."
End of conversation
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Interesting idea. Is the implication that legislators wait on votes that please special interests at the expense of constituents until there’s a disaster to provide them cover? Are the bills voted on immediately after a disaster comparable to other bills?
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We find no evidence that passage votes are strategically scheduled to coincide with disasters. In light of that, we believe the mechanism is moral hazard, conditional on the issues of the day.
End of conversation
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