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Thread about our new paper, which gives a description of the rise of the Radical Right in Sweden, both from the supply side (politicians) and the demand side (voters) — with @ollefolke. https://drive.google.com/file/d/115uMhYnCNqt_sb48R38uU4Tn3gldeaeq/view … 1/9pic.twitter.com/k9Qmc68kqS
The Sweden Democrats entered parliament in 2010 and became the third largest party in 2014 — a rise that preceded the 2015 refugee crisis. We link the rise to two macroeconomic events that triggered income inequality and job insecurity for large labor market segments. 2/9pic.twitter.com/ml0tbAc4wq
1. In 2006—12, dramatic tax and spending cuts were implemented to "make work pay", causing people without stable employment to fall behind in disposable income (left). 2. The GFC caused job insecurity among people with stable jobs, but vulnerable to automation (right). 3/9pic.twitter.com/XFGydEOK6A
We measure if groups with deteriorating economic conditions are over-represented among SD politicians, who are perfectly identified in register data. We study voting in municipalities and electoral precincts (<1,200 people), and with annual register data for all residents. 4/9
Outsiders plus vulnerable insiders make up 50% of the population, 60% of SD politicians, but just 30% of politicians in other parties. The SD:s over-representation is greater for sub-categories of outsiders who lost out more from the reform agenda (see Figure 5 in the paper). 5/9pic.twitter.com/JYyiX9OeVn
The SD gained most votes where inequality grew most (i.e., outsiders lost most), and where insiders were most exposed to job-loss (i.e. vulnerable insider share highest). This relationship is also strong between electoral precincts within municipalities (see Figure 10). 6/9pic.twitter.com/yVMvQwdPIB
The relationships are strong in regressions with flexible controls for education, age, and industrial composition, various (consistently insignificant) controls for immigration. Crime rates, media reporting on immigration, and political contextual variables added in Appendix. 7/9pic.twitter.com/ACmJ8CpDFV
SD politicians appear to be citizen candidates for their voters. They come from the same labor market strata, hurt by the economic events; and they share negative outlooks on political elites and immigrants. They are also new to politics: only 2% have been elected before. 8/9pic.twitter.com/njFvcmYqWX
The rise of the Sweden Democrats has brought people from under-represented, low-resource groups into the political arena. This could be interpreted as a positive change to descriptive representation, or a threat to the qualifications of the political class. 9/9
An interesting paper carefully analyzing SD parliamentary candidates, rarely examined. But can you control for authoritarian values? Perhaps some suitable items from the Comparative Candidate Study II? Eg attached. http://www.comparativecandidates.org/ pic.twitter.com/B85c1DlJ20
Thanks for your kind words and input!The discussion in your recent work on "latent" and "trigger" factors for RRP mobilization has been a major inspiration for us. We will think more about authoritarian values and check what controls our data allows.
Have you been able to follow up with some additional controls for authoritarian values? Anyway: Thank you for your fascinating work!
We are still working on a first version of the paper, but it turned out to be very hard to find proxies for authoritarian values in our Swedish survey data, unfortunately :(
Thanks for the update, what a pity! Looking forward to the paper.
Hi Johanna. I'm a reporter with @TheLocalSweden and am putting together a report covering your paper. Would you mind following me back so I can PM you a clarifying question or two?
Thank you for a very good article.
Also, SD captures a niche in desc. representation, the less educated and more unemployed in comparison to the population levels @satuhelskepic.twitter.com/jISfxWbloN
Thanks, yes, we also comment on the education divide in our Figure 16, and the unemployment differential (partially) shown in Figure 5.
Jätteintressant! Har ni några tankar runt att SD av allt att döma fortsatt växa även sedan ekonomin hämtat sig och rödgröna regeringen till viss del höjt bidragsnivåer och skatter?
Ja vi tror att det är relevant att ojämlikheten i disponibel inkomst har legat relativt konstant under den här mandatperioden. Stora delar av arbetslinjens reformer har fått ligga kvar. Se ex. Diagram 4.1 här https://www.regeringen.se/49740c/contentassets/24b2129000954f969ab9bf6b4620dac9/fordelningspolitisk-redogorelse.pdf …
If actual exposure to immigration does not explain 'populist' support, doesn't perceived exposure to immigration explain it? I thought that had been established in the US case by Michael Tesler et al?
There is certainly more to explore about the link between economic anxiety and perceived exposure to immigration. In the Swedish case, I would say that the perception that immigration is crowding out welfare state expenditures is crucial.
Instead of writing perceived exposure to immigration, I should have written the link between MISperceived negative consequences of immigration and economic anxiety.
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