Jeremiah Cox

@int0x6

Microsoft Employee, but my tweets are my own...

Earth, sometimes
Vrijeme pridruživanja: travanj 2011.

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  1. Prikvačeni tweet
    21. lis 2019.

    A lot of hard work from many great folks... We added code that reduced the attack surface 😁

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  2. 4. stu 2019.
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  3. 1. stu 2019.
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  4. 27. velj 2019.

    Another interesting part of this platform IMHO is the open source OpTee Trusted Platform Module (TPM)

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  5. 26. velj 2019.
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  6. 26. velj 2019.

    Reminder that Project Mu (not moo) is

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  7. 26. velj 2019.

    Build, boot, & play with Project Mu on NXP's i.MX8 .

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  8. 19. pro 2018.
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  9. 17. lis 2018.
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  10. 7. ruj 2018.

    Regarding Thunderbolt DMA attacks... my co-conspiratators have published the following:

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  11. 6. ruj 2018.

    Both Secure Launch (a.k.a. DRTM, System Guard, Intel TXT) & DMA Guard on display in the screenshots on the updated BitLocker Countermeasures doc:

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  12. 7. kol 2018.

    Security "researchers" who send unencrypted emails signed "Sent from my iPad"...

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  13. 20. srp 2018.
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  14. 4. srp 2018.

    Note, "Early boot DMA protection" is a separate feature that requires separate OEM enablement. EBDP protects an entire SRTM boot chain including both VTL0 and VTL1. DRTM enhances security for VTL1 & VTL1-secured assets.

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  15. 28. lip 2018.

    DMA Guard (RS4 engineering name) is the "DMA Protection" feature that folks assumed was present in Device Guard. You won't have end-to-end protection until new, compatible UEFI arrives in market.

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  16. 28. lip 2018.

    Retweeting as some are unaware. Device Guard "guards" against malware, not physical attacks. "Device Guard DMA Protection" guards _VBS_ assets from malicious DMA initiated by malware (e.g. already compromised kernel). It does not protect normal kernel from physical attacker.

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  17. proslijedio/la je Tweet

    - I'm pleased to announce we've been working on a document to clarify how we define security boundaries, features and mitigations in Windows. We are sharing the draft copy with the community and welcome your feedback!

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  18. 19. lip 2018.

    "The highest level of trust is likely to require the following features … Dynamic root-of-trust measurements at boot "

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  19. proslijedio/la je Tweet

    Real Zero Trust: When you don't have to trust UEFI because you are are rocking DRTM and Intel TXT boot.

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  20. proslijedio/la je Tweet

    How cool is this -- Windows insider preview has a new security feature which uses the IOMMU to block DMA access for thunderbolt devices when your machine is locked.

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