6/ Intuitively, these (a) & (b) statements contain a contradiction. Surely a chip cannot be at once 1/ so inefficient to be useless (and free) & 2/ efficient enough that they can be practically used for mining computation?
-
-
17/ As long as there is a robust second-hand market for older ASICs (and I suspect this market will improve with time), the cost of using old ASICs or new ASICs for an attack (or honest mining) should be the same. And it’s a stock cost, not flow cost.
Show this thread -
18/ The entire paper is built on the assumption that the cost of 51% attacks is flow-based, not stock-based. So if the flow-based assumption is incorrect, the collapse theories advanced by the paper are invalid.
Show this thread -
19/ P.S.: The other thing the paper hugely underestimates is Bitcoin community's ability in dealing with such an attack. h/t
@nic__carter One only has to look at last year's UASF movement in dealing with Segwit2x. But this is a separate topic.Show this thread -
20/ P.S. #2: I want to say that regardless of the validity of the points discussed here, Budish's paper raises a very important topic. It forces us to look deeper into Bitcoin's security model & likely develop better pricing models. For that, it's a huge win.
Show this thread
End of conversation
New conversation -
Loading seems to be taking a while.
Twitter may be over capacity or experiencing a momentary hiccup. Try again or visit Twitter Status for more information.
