5/ The difference is that claims would be accepted as first-class citizens by the protocol & the nodes, just like transactions & blocks. Blocks still need to meet difficulty target to be added to the chain.
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16/ What if someone retroactively goes back and mines block T. He won’t be able to rewrite the block, but he could send a claim for block T even though he did not originally work on block T. Effectively “stealing the pot”.
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17/ One possible way to alleviate (not eliminate) this problem is to limit the amount of reward that could be re-distributed beyond the initial miner. Say, initial miner is guaranteed at least 50% of the pot.
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18/ Biggest problem: Complexity. Already you can see how much complexity is added to the protocol to accommodate sharing behavior. There are potentially many unknown gaming behaviors that can arise due to the added rules. Complexity is the enemy of security. Exhibit A: Ethereum.
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19/ Conclusion: IMO, if sharing reward is desirable, it's much better to add that functionality via a higher layer protocol, such as BetterHash, without compromising the underlying protocol. Unix philosophy has served us extremely well.https://twitter.com/hugohanoi/status/1004455570953330689 …
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In p2pool and
#braidpool all payouts must be committed to in the shares. The shares are valid Bitcoin blocks with lower PoW. So the winning miner has no choice in the payout -- he committed to it before he started hashing that block and can't change it afterwards.Thanks. Twitter will use this to make your timeline better. UndoUndo
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