2/ Below is a hypothetical model to examine these challenges in details. It’s by no means the only way to do it, but regardless of how you do it, you’d need to solve the 2 problems above.
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13/ The first claim is always by the miner who successfully mined the block. So there will always be at least one claim for each pot of reward.
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14/ Potential problems with such a protocol: - Huge overhead in validation / traffic, as nodes will have a lot of claims to process / propagate
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15/ Miner who mines block T+100 has a lot of power in terms of choosing what claims to honor. He can’t include a bogus claim, but he can choose which claims in the mempool to include / overlook. Not clear if this is solvable.
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16/ What if someone retroactively goes back and mines block T. He won’t be able to rewrite the block, but he could send a claim for block T even though he did not originally work on block T. Effectively “stealing the pot”.
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17/ One possible way to alleviate (not eliminate) this problem is to limit the amount of reward that could be re-distributed beyond the initial miner. Say, initial miner is guaranteed at least 50% of the pot.
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18/ Biggest problem: Complexity. Already you can see how much complexity is added to the protocol to accommodate sharing behavior. There are potentially many unknown gaming behaviors that can arise due to the added rules. Complexity is the enemy of security. Exhibit A: Ethereum.
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19/ Conclusion: IMO, if sharing reward is desirable, it's much better to add that functionality via a higher layer protocol, such as BetterHash, without compromising the underlying protocol. Unix philosophy has served us extremely well.https://twitter.com/hugohanoi/status/1004455570953330689 …
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