Rezultati pretraživanja
  1. CRLs are still used by the Web PKI. It appears some CAs don't think they need to keep them online...

  2. 12. lis 2019.

    The proper way to read the BRs is to interpret them with a full understanding of the history and intent of each requirement. Also, the proper way to read the BRs is to interpret them exactly as written without any regard for the intent and history of each requirement.

  3. Again proving live OCSP in the is a nightmare (Upstream OCSP cache is stale. Seems OK elsewhere)

  4. 63,082,038 valid certs known to ; 33,619,372 active certs. Follows that 53% of certs in today are from LE.

  5. 12. srp 2018.

    I had a blast on vacation with this wonderful book written by and published by . I'm currently only in the half but already cannot recommend it enough. It's a MUST-READ for anyone interested in or .

  6. Math updated: 90.4% of Registered Domains (eTLD+1) using are new to the

  7. 26. ruj 2016.

    Mozilla has decided how to respond to WoSign and StartCom miss-issuance -

  8. 20. ruj 2018.

    Do you find cryptography and PKI interesting? Do you want to help secure and operate Google's publicly trusted CAs? Are you in Pittsburgh or New York? DM me.

  9. Can one shrink the 's certificate state to be as small as a photo? Mozilla Security Engineering is publishing a series of blog posts about , a technology to compress and push revocations to users, now in

  10. We're about to start an experiment with the new IETF draft for Delegated Credentials in in together with , giving another path to short-lived certs on the

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  11. 2. lis 2018.

    Some things just never change #2004

  12. 3. velj 2017.
  13. 25. stu 2019.

    Domain validation support will be integrated into CT logs and CAs will no longer be needed for . CT logs already serve as root of trust anyway.

  14. 6. kol 2019.

    Looks like there is a new root CA in the Microsoft Root store, based in South Africa, TrustFactory -

  15. 15. ruj 2018.

    2y from submission to recommended approval, next step final approval and distribution.

  16. 10. sij
  17. 23. srp 2019.

    Semi-Breaking - google/Android will remove current and reject proposed roots as well

  18. 18. srp 2019.

    has begun to use their root CA (rejected for inclusion in '16) to force all resident internet users users to install their certs to access the internet, effectively abusing it in a MitM attack.

  19. 9. srp 2019.

    I'd be opening a bottle of champagne if I had one in the fridge

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