I don’t understand why you think functionalists won’t want to adopt PCS. “These special phenomenal concepts can denote functional (or physical) properties without expressing some irreducibly qualitative modes of presentation of them” from entry on functionalism at SEP
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i don't *think* that they have to not want to adopt PCS anymore. i just wonder whether the choice between PCS vs illusionism would still matter nearly as much if we knew that functionalism was definitely right.
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I voted "changes everything" because that stipulation just is the stipulation that phenomenal consciousness is real (and something functional), and so illusionism is, by stipulation, false. But maybe I'm not properly understanding the stipulation...
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I guess if you are a Kernion-style modest conceptual functionalist, you can underatand the stipulation as not committing to phenomenal realism, but I take this to be a non-standard understanding of "functionalism".
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Functionalism implies that consciousness exists (because consciousness is presumably = an existing function), and thereby that illusionism is certainly false. So should lead one to definitely rule out illusionism?
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I think Functionalism would imply that Consciousness is reducable to a number of actual or potential states. That seems to be incompatible with at least some views on consciousness. I think that was the trust of a lot of
@De_dicto ‘s early work right?
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