This is a major conclusion of my dissertation. When attention is misallocated in a way that people are asked to make judgments on something they don't have the background knowledge to evaluate, they'll evaluate it using easily-accessible stereotyping.
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Replying to @generativist @Aelkus
That's not in any way original. But, the decomposition is useful. Crudely, imagine you can decompose a belief into {direct experience, social experience}. So long as the ratio of the former to the latter stays within certain bounds, estimates will approach correct.
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Replying to @generativist @Aelkus
But, when that ratio skews too heavily on the social, you get the entropic delirium effect. The social payoff to either in-group validation and out-group rejection dominates, and group-truth is an ineffectual tether.
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Replying to @generativist @Aelkus
Since mass and social media fluffs engagements by explicitly driving people to these contexts -- endlessly creating these collision zones -- its just a factory for dislocations. But, it spills over because the group stereotypes cut across particular contexts.
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Replying to @generativist @Aelkus
Fascinating. What is the definition of 'social experience'?
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Replying to @kareem_carr @Aelkus
Direct: "I ate the red berries. I got sick. I'm not going to do that again." Social: "KAREEM, DON'T EAT THOSE RED BERRIES, YOU'LL GET SICK! TRUST ME!"
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It's generally an adaptive heuristic. The world is "too big [...] for direct acquaintance." But, when the distrust dominates, you get, "Hrm, I can't trust Johnny. He just want's these delicious berries for himself."
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