Emily Jin

@ew_jin

Noodling over U.S.-China economic, technological, & ideological competition. Research

@CNASdc

. Views mine. 博观约取，厚积薄发。

Washington, DCJoined July 2016

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1,403 Followers

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Emily Jin

@ew_jin

Sep 23, 2022

I testified on China's development of CIPS & eCNY for a 9/20

@FSCDems

subcmte on NSIDMP hearing “Under the Radar: Alternative Payment Systems & the National Security Impacts of Their Growth." Text: bit.ly/3xHPu7e Watch feed here: bit.ly/3BrZUsO or here 📺: 1/14

“Averting a Great Divergence” by Peer Vries, the first stop on the voyage into Japan’s industrialization and the co-evolution of state and economy in the process! Key take aways 🧵

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Jonathon P Sine

@JonathonPSine

Jan 7

Folks familiar with Japan: what do you recommend as the best book(s) on the evolution of Japan’s political economy since the Meiji restoration?

Tune in to .

’s crypto spy thriller podcast! The content is on a need-to-know basis only. I’m read-in. Are you?

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Yaya J. Fanusie

@SignCurve

Jan 16

Ever hear of a #crypto spy thriller? I've been working on one for over 3 years. It's finally ready: A spy thriller #podcast called The Jabbari Lincoln Files. Subscribe now before the files self-destruct. sites.libsyn.com/452454

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Can Democracies Cooperate w/ 🇨🇳 on AI research? New

@BrookingsInst

paper that I helped work on tries to answer+give concrete recs. Mini 🧵on: -Assessing Chinese capabilities -Q's researchers engaging w/ China should ask -Great graphs by

@emergingtechobs

brookings.edu

Can democracies cooperate with China on AI research?

This working paper by Cameron Kerry, Joshua P. Meltzer, and Matt Sheehan considers whether and to what extent international collaboration with China on AI can endure.

Another power review thread —

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Jonathon P Sine

@JonathonPSine

Jan 6

Historical narratives are crafted not just by winners, but by those able or attentive enough to leave recognizable traces in the historical record. Archeologists, anthropologists, and historians interpret history largely through such extant sources.

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Emily Jin Retweeted

Center for Strategic Translation

@CSTranslate

Jan 4

Announcing a CST panel event: "Chinese Politics as Chinese See It: What Reading China's Establishment Intellectuals Can Teach Us" Join

@RollandNadege

@CSISFreeman

, and David Ownby at the National Press Club on Jan 18 to discuss the Chinese public sphere

lu.ma

Panel Event: Chinese Politics As Chinese See It: What Reading China's Establishment Intellectuals...

Please join us at the National Press Club at 2:00 p.m. on Wednesday, January 18th for the panel event “Chinese Politics As Chinese See It: What Reading China's Establishment Intellectuals...

This one was a mind expander for me

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Jonathon P Sine

@JonathonPSine

Jan 1

#2 - Seeing Like A State by James C. Scott State's strive to create easily administrable, legible conditions ("statistics" derives from "state"), but when conjoined to an authoritarian state pursuing a "high modernist" ideology, as Scott vividly argues, tragedies unfurl.

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The year 2022, in books! My top ten: #1 - The Old Regime and the Revolution by Alexis de Tocqueville Maybe the best book I've ever read. Brimming with insight on the human condition, in effortlessly elegant prose. I see why Wang Qishan made it mandatory Politburo reading.

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Despite the odds (i.e. highly limited on the ground access) 2022 still produced some fascinating scholarship on China’s economy and governance. Thread 🧵of articles published in 2022 that made an impression! I've missed a lot, so please comment/send me some of your favorites!

There were many historical moments that could only happen in Leninist melodramas. Yes, kind of like Death of Stalin. Art imitates life, or is it the other way around? 12/end of thread maybe

(3) P. 195 - Brezhnev needing a moment to collect himself, believing that Khrushchev got wind of his and others’ plan to oust Khrushchev. 11/N

(2) p. 194 - Khrushchev would be bad at collaborating under the prisoner’s dilemma. 10/N

(1) P. 183 & 190 - Hua Guofeng offered his resignation in August 1980. His official removal however was not finalized until the 12th party congress in Sep 1982. Talk about an excruciating slow car crash of a political exit. 9/N

This is a serious piece of scholarship, so I was a little surprised at how many times the book poked me right in the funny bone. Some historical hilarities Torigian unearthed just sent me -- 8/N

It’s not that they didn’t have a role, but they usually played support actors in these elaborate power plays. 7/N

However, what struck me -- power struggles were also muddled by the other less aggressive players who are just passively surviving in these Leninist systems. Depending on the manipulations of power players, the less aggressive majority had to pick sides. 6/N

Khrushchev wasn’t the most popular compared to Molotov or Zhukov. Deng was arguably more popular in the Chinese political system, but certainly less a consensus player compared to Hua. (Or in Oksenberg’s words, Deng was the “ass-kicker” and Hua was the “reconciler.” P. 184) 5/N

What made sense to me upon 1st read -- power struggles were often stirred up by the most aggressive power players who were not necessarily the most popular guys in the room. 4/N

Torigian’s twin case studies demonstrate that Leninist political systems are marred by weak institutionalization and constant struggle over dominance. 3/N

Up top -- He convincingly argues an against-the-grain proof that in Post-Stalin Soviet Union and Post-Mao China, policy differences were exaggerated and secondary to personal histories and grievances in elite power struggles. 2/N

It is a treat to read Prof

@JosephTorigian

's masterful book combining historiographical & political science methodologies. A thought or two bubbling about Prestige, Manipulation, and Coercion: Elite Power Struggles in the Soviet Union and China After Stalin and Mao (2022)--1/N

“The Rise and Fall of Imperial China” by Yuhua Wang is a grand feat of a book. It covers an immense amount of history, undertakes extensive empirical work, and develops a powerful explanatory theory of state development.. But I have a fairly critical review of parts 🧵

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In addition to monitoring, the Federal Reserve should be present whenever there’s discussion about building alt pipelines. This means participating in standard-shaping discussions in institutions including the FSB, the OECD, the ISO, the G7, the G20, and other bodies. 17/end

The instructive takeaway from Hong Kong and other financial hubs’ move to explore CBDCs (such as Singapore’s Project Orchid) should be that the U.S. government needs to monitor collaborative CBDC efforts. mas.gov.sg/schemes-and-in 16/N

mas.gov.sg

Project Orchid

Find out about Project Orchid, a collaborative project between MAS and industry partners that aims to build the foundational digital infrastructure and blueprint required for a future digital...

Hong Kong is rolling out its broader e-HKD pilot imminently, but it is unclear when the e-HKD will be fully implemented. But lack of an official delivery date should not justify inaction by policymakers. 15/N

Fintech 2025 plan’s goal of “creating next-gen data infra” mirrors similar sections in PRC’s 2022-25 Fintech Dev Plan. china-cer.com.cn/guwen/20220105 Tho HKMA claims these data infras will be dlt-based, unclear how it'd build in sufficient data security & privacy safeguards. 14/N

There is no smoking gun evidence that the PBOC had direct influence over the HKMA’s fintech dev trajectories. Nevertheless, HKMA’s goals of digitizing & leveraging the productivity of HK’s economy resonate w/ the last two fintech dev plans out of the mainland. 13/N

The HKMA released a Fintech 2025 vision document, outlining five ambitious goals spanning financial technology innovation, labor force supply, regulatory environment, data infrastructure, and developing cross-border capabilities. hkma.gov.hk/media/eng/doc/ 12/N

This brings us to the geopolitical elephant in the room. 🐘 As a financial hub that previously thrived under democratic processes, Hong Kong today looms in the shadow of mainland China. 11/N

Case in point — In October Eddie Yue, the chief executive of the HKMA, remarked that “more is more” when it comes to adopting new platforms for payments and cultivating network effects. hkma.gov.hk/eng/news-and-m 10/N

hkma.gov.hk

Hong Kong Monetary Authority - Opening Keynote at the Hong Kong FinTech Week 2022

Innovation in action - looking back to look forward Introduction Good morning, everyone. A very warm welcome to Hong Kong FinTech Week. This is an exciting week for Hong Kong. For the first time in t

But, it’s not surprising that a financial hub like Hong Kong would not want to miss out on this CBDC “Sputnik moment.” 🛰️ lawfareblog.com/mbridge-somewh

@SignCurve

9/N

lawfareblog.com

The mBridge to Somewhere: Central Banking Is Having Its Sputnik Moment

The announcement of the mBridge pilot project should serve as a wake-up call to U.S. policymakers seeking to preserve U.S. influence in the global financial system.

In a CBDC future, CBs could potentially tip the financial power imbalance away from developed economies by adopting CBDCs early & influencing standards. Tho that is an uphill battle. US financial preeminence is entrenched, & not ceding without structural macro & pol changes. 8/N

I believe Hong Kong’s real motivation for issuing its own CBDC is it wants to determine how tomorrow’s alternative financial pipelines are built. There are potential network effects as more central banks adopt CBDCs. 7/N

Granted, HK’s status as an intl financial center is on shaky ground given mainland China’s firm grasp on HK’s political liberty & democratic governance. But there so far isn’t a systemic credit event on the horizon that would warrant issuing a CBDC as a preemptive response. 6/N

2⃣ The 2nd motivation of mitigating credit risk during financial instability has more mileage. ⬆️ CBDC = the public can hold CB money in electronic form. Because the e-HKD is the liability of the CB, it is not tied to the failure of commercial entities = reduces credit risk. 5/N

1⃣ Since the under-banked population is negligible in Hong Kong, financial inclusion alone is not a compelling rationale to promote the e-HKD (and even the HKMA policy paper agrees). hkma.gov.hk/media/eng/doc/ 4/N

Typical drivers for issuing digital central bank money, such as enhanced financial inclusion and reduced credit risk, seem good on paper, but are not convincing when considered in Hong Kong’s financial context. 3/N

💱As a global financial hub, HK has a vested interest in shaping the development of CBDCs and especially the systems in which they will transact across borders. However, it is important to consider why Hong Kong wants to issue the e-HKD in the first place. 2/N