John Protevi's Blog: Lecture notes on Louise Barrett, _Beyond the Brain_http://proteviblog.typepad.com/protevi/2018/01/lecture-notes-on-louise-barrett-beyond-the-brain.html …
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Replying to @JohnProtevi
As you know, I think we should reclaim “representation” as a cogsci term, rather than getting rid of it. I think that’s one of the only enactivist quirks I worry about ;-)
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Replying to @NeuroYogacara @JohnProtevi
The enactivist criticism of "representations" assumes that reps have to be propositional. But that's not true!
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And (3) these two functions are supposed to be not merely "as-if" descriptions from outside by an observer, but operational for system
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I think there is little reason to believe that the semantic mapping will be anything like folk-semantics. Something closer to Kathleen’s view strikes me as right; like her, I think any account of reps has to be grounded in what matters to particular systems. 1/2
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Replying to @NeuroYogacara @evantthompson and
This is why I worry about the hardcore PP view. It’s also why I think the most promise is in careful, bottom-up examinations of learning circuits, which are coupled to biologically prepared capacities 2/2
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Agree with this too. I think PP has real problems explaining where priors come from in a nonstationary world
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Replying to @evantthompson @JohnProtevi
Agreed in re: PP. It's right to say that PP is deeply Kantian. That's the problem!
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And where Kant is the problem, Pheno is the solution ;)
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