John Protevi's Blog: Lecture notes on Louise Barrett, _Beyond the Brain_http://proteviblog.typepad.com/protevi/2018/01/lecture-notes-on-louise-barrett-beyond-the-brain.html …
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Replying to @JohnProtevi
As you know, I think we should reclaim “representation” as a cogsci term, rather than getting rid of it. I think that’s one of the only enactivist quirks I worry about ;-)
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Replying to @NeuroYogacara @JohnProtevi
The enactivist criticism of "representations" assumes that reps have to be propositional. But that's not true!
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And (3) these two functions are supposed to be not merely "as-if" descriptions from outside by an observer, but operational for system
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I think there is little reason to believe that the semantic mapping will be anything like folk-semantics. Something closer to Kathleen’s view strikes me as right; like her, I think any account of reps has to be grounded in what matters to particular systems. 1/2
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Agreed. We (Varela and I) are argued this for colour. I don't deny there are internal structures that selectively relate the agent to agent-relative properties. But I think using "representation" for them is very misleading, given the history of RTM
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Fodor and his crew definitely poisoned the well! I wish Sellars wrote more on this stuff; he was starting from a cybernetic perspective, and defended a nominalistic and process based metaphysics. His claims are suggestive, but far too underdeveloped
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Check out this paper by Jay Garfield on how "representation" has had its day: https://jaygarfield.files.wordpress.com/2014/01/intention-doing-awauy-with-mental-representation.pdf …
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