All it really means is there's nothing more to the essence of a feeling than is known when you know how it feels. Doesn't that seems kind of self-evident? (I know that's not a great argument, and I do have IBE arguments for it, but off the record it does seem to me self-evident)
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Replying to @Philip_Goff @jasonintrator and
It doesn't seem self-evident to me. Feelings are often perplexing, opaque, and I don't know what to say about them until I investigate them, see how they stand in relation to other feelings and thoughts, and learn about their biophysical and sociocultural configurations
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Replying to @evantthompson @jasonintrator and
Do you think there's anything I know about the essence of a feeling when I attend to how it feels? Does Mary learn something about the essence of red experiences when she learns what it's like have one? I think a partial grasp of essence is enough to get the argument going.
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Replying to @Philip_Goff @jasonintrator and
If you put the questions this way, then I would have to say no. I'm very doubtful about the concept of "essence" here. Also, I think the Mary case is just a weak intuition pump that shows nothing decisive.
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Replying to @evantthompson @jasonintrator and
I think there are lots of necessary properties of experiences we know through introspection, e.g. what it's like to see orange is similar to what it's like to see red, & I find it hard to make sense of this if introspection reveals nothing of their essence.
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Replying to @Philip_Goff @evantthompson and
Do we have to 'introspect' to know red and orange look similar?
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Replying to @SisyphusRedemed @evantthompson and
I wasn't talking about red and orange but the character of the *experiences* or red and orange.
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Replying to @Philip_Goff @SisyphusRedemed and
Which thing you call red, and which thing you call orange, and relative to which relation of similarity. As stated, I don’t think there’s any way to tell whether red experiences are similar to orange experiences
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Replying to @NeuroYogacara @Philip_Goff and
Orange also looks similar to blue. We get a grip on what similarity means by constructing psychophysical quality spaces based on similarity judgments. These spaces have different metrics and dimensions depending on context so similarity isn't well-defined outside of one of them
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Replying to @evantthompson @NeuroYogacara and
Interesting. Is there an argument that resemblance between experiences always depends on similarity judgements rather than vice versa? I'm inclined to think if very often goes the other way round. Not sure who the onus is on.
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My point is that "resemblance" isn't well-defined unless you specify a quality space, and to do that, you need resemblance judgments.
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Replying to @evantthompson @NeuroYogacara and
I'm inclined to think some some ways of carving up the world are more natural than others. Ted Sider, e.g. in 'Writing the book of the world', has some pretty good arguments for this view.
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Replying to @Philip_Goff @evantthompson and
I don’t find those arguments plausible, and I think that this kind of hope is the core of what’s wrong with analytic philosophy - but you already know that this is one of the main places where we diverge from one another
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