It's biopsychism (Ernst Haeckel's term) but not necessarily panpsychism. The idea is that you need the kind of self-individuation of living processes for sentience; minus that, physical processes lack sentience.
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Replying to @evantthompson @NeuroYogacara and
Got it. Very close to panpsychism, depending on whether you emphasize the self aspect or the conscious feel aspect I suppose.
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Replying to @jasonintrator @NeuroYogacara and
But motivated by very different questions and methods from panpsychism, especially in its currently popular form, which is based on so-called intuitions about transparency (which, to my mind, are utterly unreliable)
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Replying to @evantthompson @NeuroYogacara and
Right, completely. I myself am much more sympathetic to thinking about the centrality of perspective, so I’m really looking forward to your arguments.
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Replying to @jasonintrator @evantthompson and
Even: Curious to know what you mean by 'transparency intuitions', and why you think they're unreliable.
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Replying to @Philip_Goff @jasonintrator and
I mean the belief that you know the essence of your phenomenal state just by attending to it and thinking about it in terms of how it feels. I don't think such metacognitive activities disclose essences or are reliable guides by themselves to how things are
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Replying to @evantthompson @jasonintrator and
Right, that's what I thought you meant. Indeed, that's what I think the anti-physicalist arguments hang on (from which Chalmers' 2D stuff is a bit of a distraction). Do you have any particular reason for thinking transparency is false?
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Replying to @Philip_Goff @evantthompson and
All it really means is there's nothing more to the essence of a feeling than is known when you know how it feels. Doesn't that seems kind of self-evident? (I know that's not a great argument, and I do have IBE arguments for it, but off the record it does seem to me self-evident)
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Replying to @Philip_Goff @jasonintrator and
It doesn't seem self-evident to me. Feelings are often perplexing, opaque, and I don't know what to say about them until I investigate them, see how they stand in relation to other feelings and thoughts, and learn about their biophysical and sociocultural configurations
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Replying to @evantthompson @jasonintrator and
Do you think there's anything I know about the essence of a feeling when I attend to how it feels? Does Mary learn something about the essence of red experiences when she learns what it's like have one? I think a partial grasp of essence is enough to get the argument going.
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If you put the questions this way, then I would have to say no. I'm very doubtful about the concept of "essence" here. Also, I think the Mary case is just a weak intuition pump that shows nothing decisive.
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Replying to @evantthompson @jasonintrator and
I think there are lots of necessary properties of experiences we know through introspection, e.g. what it's like to see orange is similar to what it's like to see red, & I find it hard to make sense of this if introspection reveals nothing of their essence.
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Replying to @Philip_Goff @evantthompson and
Do we have to 'introspect' to know red and orange look similar?
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