I am endlessly baffled by 4E theorists who argue that "embodiment" is somehow the unique domain of humans, as if particular machines don't always have bodies situated in particular contexts. Let's talk about Dreyfus' critique of AI! (Megathread)https://twitter.com/EvanSelinger/status/1230143556913893377 …
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Replying to @eripsa
Good thread. But most 4E theorists don't claim this. I don't, Varela didn't. For us, it's about what's required of a system to have/be a body and be situated. (Most designed systems/machines don't meet the requirements.) There's no claim of human uniqueness.
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Replying to @evantthompson
Yes, all of the *good* 4E theorists avoid this mistake =) I'm a big fan of Tom Froese's work on enactive AI! http://bit.ly/2V8jFBX I am curious about your thoughts on how the Dreyfus-Heidegger arguments meets up with (good) enactivism?
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Replying to @eripsa
Froese's paper is excellent. For me, the meeting place is the critique of representationist thinking and recognition of the need for a properly grounded account of intentionality.
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Replying to @evantthompson @eripsa
Asian Analytic Philosophy appreciates the role of paraconsistency in embodiment. Is there a single Embodiment-oriented philosopher that synthesizes historical insights around "improper parthood", contradiction/contrareity, explosion wrt computability theory, & Life?
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Varela F. J. (1976) Not one, not two. CoEvolution Quarterly 12: 62–67. Available at https://cepa.info/2055
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Replying to @evantthompson @eripsa
This paper is better with the accompanying jazz album playing in the background, right?
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Could be. I've not listened to that album.
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