I'm not arguing against distinct explanatory levels. I'm saying computation is a heuristic without a specification of how its implemented.
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Would deciding between these two (or assuming both as possibilities) make a critical difference on how a computational model should be algorithmically characterised and mapped (one to one, many to one, etc.) to other structure levels?
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I think so. If operational, then this constrains the algorithm and mapping; if just behavioral characterization from outside perspective of modeler/observer, then these constraints may be weaker. (If I understand properly your question.)
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so many tensions among & within prediction, explanation, reduction, intervention, simulation, model/representation. internal/external cuts thru through some of that (leaving inner innards of course). often seems that "seeing" the "mechanism" distinguishes "explanation". but ...
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a describer of behavioral relations to externals can always say that what the behavior does is more personally relevant than the internal ingredients of how. trivial example: a look up table is not the same as a series expansion... unless all one cares about is the result?
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I’m not sure. This is coming together on the fly. It’s in the vicinity of neuroconstructive stuff, and some of Mike Anderson’s stuff, but I have to think more about how I’m thinking about things... I feel like my thoughts on these issues are currently unstable.
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