emptywheel

No. Not until after it gets laundered. 702 collection is always 702 collection and treated as such. What is the basis for your laundering theory?

We're agreeing. 702 is used to ID an American. A Title I order is obtained. And maybe if the person is likely they'll get TI notice, but not 702 notice.

If the FISA app is based on 702 collection and an American is prosecuted in a US court asked on the FISA take, the govt will disclose the use of 702 and it can be challenged in the CIPA litigation, just like Title I collection.

It is your affirmative claim that even Title I take based on info obtained under 702 is always noticed? Which would be 1) saying that 702 has only led to 8-10 people's prosecution and 2) 702 has never led to prosecution of Chinese-related target. That's your claim?

I did say it was rare. Most agents I know would rather get info through regular process than FISA & that goes double for 702 because it's hard to use. I can't speak to particular cases, but policy is consistently applied at DOJ, in my experience. I fled the Trump regime.

If 702 has only been used in 8-10 prosecutions, and in no Chinese-related prosecutions, I'm sure we can just shut down FBI's access to it. Great! Problem solved. But that does not, in fact, reflect the reality. Which is why I use the words "parallel construction" or launder.

Prosecution is not the only option in the intel world. On what do you base your idea of what the reality is? What did FBI say to suggest it is applie differently for CI?

And yet there are a ton of prosecutions against Chinese related targets. FBI has made it clear that only CT defendants have gotten noticed (which is what the record reflects, tho even there there are a good number we know didn't get notice).