So, nuance isn't your thing? Ok. Go Pats!
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Replying to @Marys_musings @qjurecic and
Is it, or is it not, the case that people (and I've got a number of people in mind) who got prosecuted off stuff that came in largely for an Intel function? In at least two cases, erroneously, I'll add.
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Replying to @emptywheel @qjurecic and
FISA info is used in prosecutions - typically, for the targets of the FISA. It's not alway a terrorism charge because proving something else might be easier and disruption is one of our nat sec tools. 702 isn't used much. It's too difficult to get use authority. Which cases?
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Replying to @Marys_musings @qjurecic and
Yes, "702 is not used much" until after it gets laundered. We're back to that again. And NEVER directly used with the FG targets against whom (I've been told) FISA is actually used with more frequently. Because that would make the costs too obvious.
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Replying to @emptywheel @qjurecic and
No. Not until after it gets laundered. 702 collection is always 702 collection and treated as such. What is the basis for your laundering theory?
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Replying to @Marys_musings @qjurecic and
We're agreeing. 702 is used to ID an American. A Title I order is obtained. And maybe if the person is likely they'll get TI notice, but not 702 notice.
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Replying to @emptywheel @qjurecic and
If the FISA app is based on 702 collection and an American is prosecuted in a US court asked on the FISA take, the govt will disclose the use of 702 and it can be challenged in the CIPA litigation, just like Title I collection.
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Replying to @Marys_musings @qjurecic and
It is your affirmative claim that even Title I take based on info obtained under 702 is always noticed? Which would be 1) saying that 702 has only led to 8-10 people's prosecution and 2) 702 has never led to prosecution of Chinese-related target. That's your claim?
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Replying to @emptywheel @qjurecic and
I did say it was rare. Most agents I know would rather get info through regular process than FISA & that goes double for 702 because it's hard to use. I can't speak to particular cases, but policy is consistently applied at DOJ, in my experience. I fled the Trump regime.
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Replying to @Marys_musings @qjurecic and
If 702 has only been used in 8-10 prosecutions, and in no Chinese-related prosecutions, I'm sure we can just shut down FBI's access to it. Great! Problem solved. But that does not, in fact, reflect the reality. Which is why I use the words "parallel construction" or launder.
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Moreover, FBI has made it fairly clear that it is not applied the same for Chinese-related (and I'm sure now Russian) targets as it is w/CT.
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