emptywheel

Oops, sorry -- I thought you were referring to the part about the use of Section 702 to make demands on companies to weaken encryption. I don't know why, since that seems like a distinct issue. I do wonder if the issue of entirely domestic communications is only about Tor/VPN.

430K Americans use Tor each day. Isn't that enough?

Sure, but I've wondered if there are additional aspects of it. Something about Wyden's emphasis on "knowing" collection of "entirely domestic" "communications" calls to mind something potentially even more straightforward.

It is straightforward. You suck off an exit node. Voila: Foreign traffic, domestic traffic. Weed out the domestic but in the process look for porn, CFAA violators, and BLM.

I wouldn't doubt it. From a tactical point of view, though, I'd be a bit surprised if Wyden were going to such lengths to highlight an activity that primarily involved something as strongly associated with CP in the public's mind as Tor. Open to the possibility that I'm wrong.

And also associated with dissidents. Is it your official position that it's cool NSA is sucking up dissident traffic and deciding whether it's criminal or not on the back side?

Of course not. Our view would no doubt be the human rights view that a government interference with privacy violates rights unless it's explicitly authorized by law, necessary, and proportionate (and non-discriminatory)

Well, it is a collection that will get, in addition to CP and dark markets and the like, a significant proportion of dissident, journalist, and similar traffic. And NSA gets to review it and decide whether it's criminal.