Failure of cyberops against ISIS is a significant sore spot within DOD. But also important to question whether the expectations were ever realistic or achievable. https://twitter.com/sultanofcyber/status/934586903780839427 …
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It's a topic that deserves exploration. One issue is there aren't many primary source public docs yet on it. Need some FOIA or congressional inquiries to shake enough loose to spark the conversation.
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How do you define the "it" there? One thing Carter doesn't seem to mention is that intel streams in other places -- not ISIS -- might have been put at risk if cybercom did more attacks.
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As the policy guy at the time I am obviously biased but think that Carter is taken a bit out of context here. There was never a need for any exquisite/flashy cyber weapon or technique against ISIS ala “Stuxnet”. Ops were dictated by OIR needs. Full stop. cc
@sultanofcyber -
What do you mean? What should be have been doing?
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We didnt need “fancy” cyber weapons/techniques to support OIR objs. Not to mention the premise of executing cyber ops for cyber sake is a failing scenario. Policy quagmire arises (ie unmet expectations) when we treat cyber differently from other domains of warfare
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We should have been hacking rather than thinking of a cyber bomb, you mean?
End of conversation
New conversation -
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