I wrote about ISIS OPSEC and real world security.https://medium.com/@thegrugq/isis-remote-control-agent-opsec-3d0e02b35fbf?source=linkShare-8c278323b47c-1502292594 …
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There’s another one more recent that looks at a dangle operation. It’s clear they haven’t formalized and standardized their security.
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Yup. Interesting their TrueCrypt dead drops (may have) been abandoned.
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Yeah, never been mentioned again. Only mobile messengers. Too bad for them, the dead drop was probably worth pursuing.
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But as you note, not clear they've got that kind of recruit anymore.
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They have quality issues. But just when it looks really bad, the Australia plot with smuggled bomb parts shows up. So, wtf is going on?!
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They can still be surprisingly innovative, although the attacker never even made it past checkin, so quality issues (again)?
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Right--precisely my point. Never made it past check in in what I newly suspect is a big weak point in intl airline security.
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Yeah, and this I think is the lack of training showing through. You can get suicidal murderers to volunteer, but you can’t make them think
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But especially since you point out that drug opsec =/= ISIS opsec that one would be worth linking. It says as much abt kinds of recruits.
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Also the other one IIRC talked burner phones and linguistic dialects. Again--the kinds of recruits and the opsec they bring with them.
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Yeah, that was their 2015 crop of 2nd gen Belgian Moroccan petty criminals. They went different in Dhaka, and different in India.
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