@MiekeEoyang do you mean how many are in, period (i.e num of incidentals), or how many are intentionally searched for (ie. FBI 702 searches)
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@emptywheel@pwnallthethings 5 & 6 on that chart seem speculative to me. That said, if that's the fear, controls can be put in to fix it. -
@MiekeEoyang Chart's not mine, it's Mayer's. My point is that telecoms always do the scan, so can do same scan under CISA@pwnallthethings -
@emptywheel@pwnallthethings But the data searched for matters. My concern was always the definition of "signature." -
@MiekeEoyang Agree. My sense is DHS implementation mostly sound, but as passed set up to bypass that really easily.@pwnallthethings -
@emptywheel@pwnallthethings It's why oversight mechanisms, whistleblowers, etc. matter. Need canaries to warn of an attempt to bypass. -
@MiekeEoyang Right. & as I said, losing FISC oversight does matter. more than people realize, I think.@pwnallthethings -
@emptywheel It's actually one of the greatest strengths of 702. And missing in other areas.@pwnallthethings -
@MiekeEoyang Tho will add that IC managed to avoid very obvious oversight reporting to Congress on CISA, which is worrying.@pwnallthethings - 3 more replies
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