People in retail banking seemed to have no idea. They would insist this risk wasn’t material even though they had no way of knowing. They’d say things like: - we’re geographically diversified - 5 years average refi - property insurance (lol) - mortgage insurance (mostly lol)
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You know the Upton Sinclair quote about your salary depending on it? Anyway, it didn’t matter once the regulators talked to a variety of experts (
) and realised it was a plausible risk that deserved some analysis.2 replies 0 retweets 13 likesShow this thread -
Here is the paper from May 2016. I'm afraid some of it is Australia-specific (mortgages have a unique function in our financial system, and a less-uniquely huge role in our economy) but many of the principles translate. http://www.climateinstitute.org.au/verve/_resources/TCI-There-goes-the-neighbourhood-FINAL-30052016.pdf …
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The process of researching it - I spoke with many, many people - suggests to me that banks were not going to identify this risk, let alone bring it to the attention of the regulators and/or the actual public who are affected.
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Btw, regulators can't fix challenges like this, although they can go some way to addressing it. Industry won't and arguably also can't (incentives matter, who knew?). It requires policy, informed by disinterested interdisciplinary expertise + insight from multiple sectors.
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Replying to @kmac
I’m by experience, in a post-GFC context, banks wouldn’t be the ones incentivized to track that risk (or even be officially aware of it) because then they’d look like they were stuffing it into the GSEs in bad faith. And PMI is too rigid and the asset life is too short for SLR
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Replying to @NewRiverInvest @kmac
So here you would have the credit-risk guarantors (GSEs) and flood/storm insurance really being the binding constraints. The issue being kind-of that everyone in the chain has *some* exposure but also some level of credit-enhancement from a subordinated tier.
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Replying to @NewRiverInvest @kmac
And the pooling of the loans doesn’t help the problem. Like say that I am buying a Freddie Mac Credit Risk Transfer STACR note with a heterogeneous mix of geographies and MSA-level disclosure. The the SLR risk is so diluted and I have enough enhancement that it doesn’t pencil out
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Replying to @NewRiverInvest @kmac
It’s a really really interesting problem and I agree with you in the abstract. In the mechanics, I see practical impediments that enable bad risk-taking behavior due to dilution, lack of transparency, and “I’ll be gone by then” lack of recourse for other enabling behaviors
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Replying to @NewRiverInvest @kmac
Ultimately, the issue is that the only parties that could adequately model that risk would need location detail level data that only the homeowners insurance, PMI writer, title insurer, home owners, and originator lender/loan-owner have. And all of those are incentivized to close
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Me, reading this conversation:
Systemic failure just waiting to happen. Soon enough there will be a “perfect storm,” pressure points in the system will crack followed by abrubt, nonlinear failure. We’ll have a real mess on our hands.
Someone get me some chocolate! 
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