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Personally, I'm a bit of an odd duck, and reject mentalistic explanations entirely. Because of it I have been called a Skinnerian, but I'd say that's far more dismissive than decisive or detrimental. Developmentalism, like the other horticultural metaphors, is out for me too.
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It is not only easier to inspect the selective role of the environment rather than to introspect the mind, but it's also more effective as an aid changing behavior without having to "change minds".
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One reason not to is if I'm wrong. That is, if it is inaccurate or ineffective for me to reject mentalistic explanations, then I shall go back to them as fast as I can.
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The ways in which we talk about what we do change what we're likely to do. If I was the only person in the world then how I talk about it would have no consequence to anyone else: but I'm not alone, you're here too. How we talk about the world changes our shared world.
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Sorry, I realise my original tweet wasn't accurate. I was saying that if you reject mentalistic explanations and it works for you, I think that's cool! I'm not sure I would go so far as you have, but I'm pragmatic at heart, and agree with the spirit of your approach.
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How do you deal with the kind of incompatibility introduced by you saying "Piaget mental models are not a myth" and my saying "all mental models are a myth"? I'm more interested in how you came to say "Piaget mental models are a myth"
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Also, rejecting mentalistic explanations allows me to provide a simple explanation for why people talk about mental models: traditionally we say "the mind is what the brain does", but people like me say "the mind is what the body does" that is the mind is a metaphor for behavior
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