Every time I see someone describe their beliefs as their "priors," I have to fight the urge to punch a hole in the wall.
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Kind of missing the point. A prior isn't supposed to be a belief about probability. It's supposed to be a mental state with a probabilistic functional profile. Ramsay showed that, given a coherent set of preferences, we can model all human action as maximizing expected utility...
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This is the basis of the homo economicus model of human cognition. It assumes that all our desires are utilities, and all our beliefs are probabilities. But if this model is accurate, it makes concrete predictions about how humans will reason. K&T tested those predictions...
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And found them to be wrong. So much for subjective probabilities and expected utility maximization. Some (many) still hold that Ramsay described an ideal of rationality, rather than providing a descriptively accurate model of human reasoning...
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But the ideal model is not very compelling if it assumes just a completely inaccurate model of human cognition. And people who talk about "my priors" aren't speaking about an ideal, they're describing their own mental states. Inaccurately. But Bayesianism is trendy, so
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yeah I mean I come out of microeconomics we know all of our models are wrong in the sense that core utility function / preference axioms dont hold in reality, but they still serve as a pretty useful approximation in many cases map is not the territory, maps are still helpful
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Sure, we learned a lot from Ramsay, he was a genius. But behavioral econ is taking over, for good reason. Probabilistic maps are close to reality in some respects, quite far removed in others. Let's get some better maps.
End of conversation
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