t h e a x i om o f c h o i c e i s a x i o m a t i c
I thought I had made this clear, but let me try again: It is sufficient to show that Many Worlds is not a /necessary/ predicate of Free Will.
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no, you've just kept saying it, but because Conway's model doesn't say anything at all about where its free will comes from, it cannot do that because it is completely disjoint from the question
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It shows that any interpretation of QM can have free will at the quantum level. That the interpretation is orthogonal to the question of free will.
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OP claims that interpretation is /not/ orthogonal that it is compatible only with Many Worlds.
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oh, i see the difficulty. you're just talking about different things. Conway's assertion that free will of collections of particles implies free will of particles holds under any QM interpretation. pomo is saying free will itself can only come from many-worlds
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it's like if one person is saying "liquids conform to the shape of any container that holds them" and another is saying "liquids can only be poured into cylinders". the truth of these things looks related but isn't
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Yes you do need a trivial third observation: "there exist non-cylindrical containers"
End of conversation
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You seem to be confusing this for a refutation of Many Worlds itself, which it isn't.
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nah, i'm just saying that because it's treating free will as a black box it's intentionally avoiding saying anything about what's in the box, and why would it, that's not the point it's making
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as i learned trying to resolve community disputes on Wikipedia, addressing one question at a time is very nearly too many
End of conversation
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