David Woods

@ddwoods2

Releasing the Adaptive Power of Human Systems. Likes are not endorsements.

Columbus, OH
Vrijeme pridruživanja: listopad 2015.

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  1. 26. sij

    The difference between the 2 different answers at the top could seem small, but the different framing makes all the difference

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  2. 26. sij

    hence, low robustness and low resilience (and need to improve sensor system reliability) ...

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  3. 26. sij

    Each of these was badly misjudged in the 737 Max case relative to possible upsets (e.g. consequences of sensor failures) and the dynamics of upsets (a narrow window of opportunity to correct for a situation at risk of spinning out of control) ...

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  4. 26. sij

    the MCAS system was (a) very persistent with strong control authority (b) its role was invisible or oversimplified in training, practice and displays (c) re-directing MCAS and coordinating with the different automated systems was difficult in real time as the upset progressed

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  5. 26. sij

    Remember the findings in cockpit automation research:  strong, silent, difficult to direct automation is a trigger to accident sequences and undermines the ability to respond effectively, & then …

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  6. 26. sij

    The latter approach requires looking hard at how situations can present difficulties, uncertainties & potentially spin out of control and then working to empower pilots to see and handle emerging difficulties despite uncertainty and time pressure. …

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  7. 26. sij

    If Boeing presents their changes as improving reliability, robustness and resilience of the modified 737 Max, then their systems engineering is likely to have redressed their previous technical errors. …

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  8. 26. sij

    If Boeing presents their changes to the 737 Max as guards against the limits of pilots, then there is a risk the systems engineering process could be limited or incomplete. …

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  9. 26. sij

    How do we know if we can trust Boeing’s re-engineering of the 737 Max? …

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  10. 3. sij

    New capabilities trigger wide reverberations including new forms of complexity & risks Failure to anticipate new challenges that are certain to arise following periods of technology change leads to surprising negative unintended consequences that offset apparent benefits

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  11. 3. sij

    Envisioning the future is a precarious subject to biases. Past work has shown claims about the effects of future technology change are underspecified, ungrounded, and overconfident, whereas new risks are missed, ignored, or downplayed.

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  12. 22. pro 2019.

    New safety differently video and trailer has been released! And here is the trailer:

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  13. 7. lis 2019.

    1969 was scary for a teenager. Lyrics of album then - 21st century schizoid man, Epitaph & Court of Crimson King - capture our scary world today 50 years later (just got shade a bit off)

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  14. 24. ruj 2019.

    Don’t blame the dog for the water on the floor when there’s a hole in the roof. Woods & Rayo discussing misunderstandings of Safety II

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  15. 24. lip 2019.

    at first day of the Resilience Engineering Association symposium in Kalmar Sweden. A great gathering of over 140 people from multiple industries exploring how to support resilient performance.

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  16. 7. lip 2019.

    see issue #2 out today with 2 pieces where I discuss implications of the Boeing 737 Max failures

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  17. 17. svi 2019.

    analysis of ED adaptation to overload. “Beyond surge: Coping with mass burn casualty in the closest hospital to the Formosa Fun Coast Dust Explosion.” click on this link before July 04, 2019 to download

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  18. 10. svi 2019.

    See Gary Klein carefully step by step take down the superficial overuse of confirmation bias start with the actual data from original study - a lot didn't show the effect

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  19. 18. tra 2019.

    "fundamental surprise often is denied ... redefine the incident ... as if ... only a situational surprise ... lead to denial of any need to change or to attribution of the “cause” to local factors with well-bounded responses". Applies now after crashes?

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  20. 18. tra 2019.

    Stakeholder reactions to the 2 737Max accidents show signs of "The fundamental surprise error is to re-interpret an event that challenges basic assumptions as if it were merely due to narrow local factors.” p. 207 Woods et al., 1994, Behind Human Error

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