It's not really so amazing. This general disagreement has been going on for hundreds of years. Not going to be resolved by either you or Strawson, I'm afraid. :(
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I agree with you that consciousness doesn't give us access to non-physical properties, but I think you overstate this point when you seem to deny an ineffable phenomenal character. Any theory of consciousness must accept the "seemings" for what they are, and explain their origin.
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The illusion is in the nature of the seemings, not the seemings themselves.
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Perhaps this conflict could be resolved if you both agreed that: (1) Yes, we do have conscious experience (contents thereof), but (2) that this conscious experience in itself does not reveal the physical substrata with which it is correlated.
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If we were to realize words are behavior, that words don't refer but are actions, we would recognize the silliness of the argument. A behavior is non-referring interaction, and 'models' are ways to behave.
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We can imagine a distinction between a preprogrammed artificial mind/brain without mental events etc and a mind that experiences meeting artificial and real minds. E.g. computer games with AI and human controlled characters.
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