Now the TLS1.3 people are still like BUT WE WANT SPEED, SO JUST DEAL WITH IT. And the distributed systems people are like IDEMPOTENCY IS REALLY HARD, WE MEAN IT. But wait, it turns out that we can actually get anti-replay and forward secrecy back, and keep 0-RTT, how ....
No FUD! DNSSEC doesn't provide secrecy, anti-replay, or even anti-forgery in practice. If it /just/ did nothing it might be an ok experiment, but it also causes real outages due to complexity, and makes DDOSes worse. That makes it not a good idea.
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Now I'm falling into a DNSSEC hole. I agree on no secrecy and no anti-replay. Is it really not useful against anti-forgery? If not, why not? I don't see the issue other than some questionable key size/alg decisions which should get resolved over time. Am I missing something?
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Absolutely! 1/ DNSSEC does *nothing* between your Browser/computer and your resolver. But that's the weakest link! 2/ For other links, junk crypto like RSA-512 with SHA1 is still common. I can break that on my watch.
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