So I make this request, and it times out ... well fuck. Did it time out before or after adding one? Shit, what do I do? Oh I know, I'm going to query for the current value, and it's not what I expect, I'm going to go again.
-
Show this thread
-
Welcome to basically how every distributed TRANSACTION PROTOCOL works, even things like PAXOS and RAFT and MULTI-PHASE COMMIT use waiting and polling sometimes. What they don't assume is that ... AT ANY MOMENT A MISCREANT ON THE NETWORK MIGHT JUST RESEND THE ORIGINAL MESSAGE.
1 reply 0 retweets 28 likesShow this thread -
That would be CRAZY, because they USE TLS, and the S in TLS stands for "SECURITY" and that includes things like "THOU SHALT NOT MAKE MESSAGES REPLAYABLE".
1 reply 2 retweets 22 likesShow this thread -
Now the TLS1.3 people are still like BUT WE WANT SPEED, SO JUST DEAL WITH IT. And the distributed systems people are like IDEMPOTENCY IS REALLY HARD, WE MEAN IT. But wait, it turns out that we can actually get anti-replay and forward secrecy back, and keep 0-RTT, how ....
1 reply 0 retweets 27 likesShow this thread -
The answer is for the server not to use key-in-a-key BS. Instead if the server just remembers the key, let's a client use it ONCE, and deletes it when it's done ... we get FORWARD SECRECY and ANTI-REPLAY. REJOICE!!!
2 replies 0 retweets 27 likesShow this thread -
.... except it costs the server money. It has to cache more keys, and it's not easy to distribute across wide geographic areas, and comes with its own distributed systems challenges. But guess what? THAT'S ALL THE TLS SERVER'S PROBLEM.
1 reply 0 retweets 23 likesShow this thread -
... no need to modify thousands of applications, no need to teach PHP and RubyOnRails developers the intricacies of idempotency edge cases. Nope, just one slightly costly change within the TLS1.3 servers. So that's my plan, and REJOICE again, because TLS1.3 can have secure 0-RTT
1 reply 0 retweets 27 likesShow this thread -
.... unless some TLS servers would cut corners, and just want the fast benchmarks, and you know .... deploy TLS1.3 0-RTT without built-in SAFETY mechanisms. That would be INSANE, I mean, why risk bugs and side-channels, right?
2 replies 4 retweets 31 likesShow this thread -
Oh right, no that's exactly what's happening. So here's my advice: if you see a server supporting 0-RTT and that server doesn't give you an iron-clad guarantee that when the key is used, it's deleted, and that your EARLY CONVERSATION can't be repeated ... don't use it.
6 replies 21 retweets 79 likesShow this thread -
Replying to @colmmacc
Isn't introducing 0-RTT anyway, even knowing it won't be secure when servers cut corners (which many will do), basically the same as openly sacrificing security in this "secure" protocol? Considering how widely used TLS1.3 will be, this seems clearly immoral and deceptive to me
2 replies 0 retweets 2 likes
Sacrificing security ... YES. Deceptive ... YES. Immoral ... YOU DECIDE. 0-RTT will save time and energy, at scale I'm sure it could even REDUCE GLOBAL WARMING (seriously). My preference was to ban STEKs and enforce Single-Use Tickets, but it wasn't to be.
-
-
Replying to @colmmacc
Possibly—that bandwidth will probably just be used for other things instead, though. So sure, faster internet is nice, but I'm certainly not convinced it's nice enough to justify anyone who can see your traffic to be able to replay your every action
1 reply 0 retweets 0 likes -
Not to mention the environmental impact of the additional computational power and traffic required to run the secure distributed TLS1.3 servers
0 replies 0 retweets 0 likes
End of conversation
New conversation -
Loading seems to be taking a while.
Twitter may be over capacity or experiencing a momentary hiccup. Try again or visit Twitter Status for more information.