I don't know who needs to know this, but a cryptographic seed can safely generate about 700M times its size in secure random output. Meanwhile a Sequoia seed can generate a Redwood tree that is about 2.5B times its volume.
That's *definitely* not safe; with enough volume of output, the stream becomes statistically predictable. Blocks you haven't seen yet, become more and more likely. Take a look at the AES-CTR DRBG design and where it's limits are.
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I'll check it out :) For flavor, though, I'm a fan of the kCSPRNG rekeying often, and all userland code deferring to the kCSPRNG instead of rolling their own.
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For serious cryptography, I think it's ok to use the kernel rng to seed when you have nothing better, but that's it. Too many kernels have home-brew RNGs that change their designs too often, aren't formally verified, and have maintainers who don't understand cryptographic basics.
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But once the cells of the sequoia seed replicate a couple of million times, it's statistically probable you have a sequoia tree.
#trees
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