Tweeting the hash of a
- Security:
Usability: 



Tweeting the hash of a random salt and a
- Security: 

Usability: 
Tweeting the HMAC of a random key and
- Security: 




Usability:
For short
's or long-term predictions, do 2.
HMAC is far better designed than just adding random data to a hash input. Case in point: HMAC_MD5 is still ok. An adversary could produce collisions against MD5(
+ salt).
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I think you are mixing preimage and collisions. preimage: H(x, y) = z, find x, y collision: H(w, x) = H(y, z), find w, x, y, z We can't do preimages on MD5 but we can collide MD5 and thus HMAC-MD5. The "HMAC-MD5 is still safe" is only if the key is unknown.
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In either case (1 or 2), you don't publish the key/salt until you need to assert your proof. I'm don't think I'm mixing pre-image resistance and collisions :)
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