Now that I look more closely. There are nuanced differences, and Apple/Google's solution is better. DP3T has an infected person share a daily key from which all future keys can be derived. Apple/Google's discloses only the keys from the infection period.https://twitter.com/colmmacc/status/1248673126797328385 …
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Replying to @colmmacc
No, DP-3T does not allow this, as you missed a detail: check page 19 in the white paper which explains that after key disclosure, the phone will generate a new key, and is thus unlinkable regarding released key, while the infectious period before diagnosis is traceable of course.
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Replying to @RalfSasse
I did miss that detail! In my defense, the Google/Apple docs get right to the point and are easier to follow and the D3PT reference implementation in python does not do this. Still, in D3PT the infected persons IDs can be linked across the infection period days.
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Replying to @colmmacc
Yes, lots to read, and you are right, in the "low-cost design" DP3T version the infected person's IDs can be linked for the period from infection to publication. The second protocol "Unlinkable design" in DP3T prevents this though, so long as the server is honest.
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Replying to @RalfSasse @colmmacc
See "Location traceability" on page 22/23 in the whitepaper.
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I saw that and submitted a suggestion for design 2; we could use ECDH between the IDs to remove the mass-surveillance passive attacks.
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