I am uneasy with the semantics of non self-authenticating IDs. For public keys, it means your keyring is trusted. For private keys, we can try them all anyway.
-
-
I meant entirely local nicknames.
1 reply 0 retweets 1 like -
Replying to @BenLaurie @FiloSottile and
Coz, y'know, I'm not going to remember your public key's ID. I'm gonna look it up somewhere. So why not within the system?
2 replies 0 retweets 1 like -
Replying to @BenLaurie @FiloSottile and
Agreed. age already lets you specify a filename that contains public keys of recipients. I think it should search ~/.age-recipients (or similar) for these files in addition to
$PWD.1 reply 0 retweets 0 likes -
Replying to @__agwa @BenLaurie and
Hmm, I see it, but it’s also dangerously close to addressing key distribution. What about a file of “name: key” aliases with a default (but overridable with a flag I guess) location that you use with alias:foo recipients?
3 replies 0 retweets 3 likes -
Replying to @FiloSottile @__agwa and
BTW, we know how to address key distribution. :-)
1 reply 0 retweets 0 likes -
Replying to @BenLaurie @__agwa and
I'd be very happy for a transparency system to be layered on top of age, for sure :)
1 reply 0 retweets 0 likes -
Replying to @FiloSottile @BenLaurie and
How do you feel about padding? Are you going to round up to a 64KB chunk? I feel bad about leaking the exact size of the payload. Plenty of embarrassing content someone might share is finger-printable, and there are CRIME like attacks if a third-party can influence the content.
2 replies 0 retweets 0 likes -
Replying to @colmmacc @BenLaurie and
Isn’t padding to a chunk size easily defeated by straddling the boundary between +/- a chunk? This feels out of scope.
2 replies 0 retweets 0 likes -
Replying to @FiloSottile @BenLaurie and
That's only relevant to CRIME-like attacks, but even there padding is still very effective because it increases the number of trials you need to even find the boundary, and then only leaks 1 bit of information at that boundary.
1 reply 0 retweets 1 like
Padding still protects against the mundane known-file-size attacks. Seems mad to me to put the most trivial and known attack against confidentiality out of scope
Of course plenty of other schemes and protocols do this too.
Loading seems to be taking a while.
Twitter may be over capacity or experiencing a momentary hiccup. Try again or visit Twitter Status for more information.