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    Colm MacCárthaigh‏ @colmmacc 26. velj 2019.
    • Prijavi Tweet

    Colm MacCárthaigh je proslijedio/a tweet korisnika/ceRobert Merget

    Congratulations and thanks to @jurajsomorovsky, @NimrodAviram and @ic0nz1 who reported this to AWS in November last year. This was a really interesting find that took a lot of diving! Story ...https://twitter.com/ic0nz1/status/1100413895141773312 …

    Colm MacCárthaigh je dodan/na,

    Robert Merget @ic0nz1
    For our Usenix Paper we found a lot of Padding Oracle Vulnerabilities in TLS stacks of the Alexa Top-1 Million, including Citrix and OpenSSL. With @jurajsomorovsky @NimrodAviram @craigtweets @JanisFliegens and others. Check our current findings at: https://github.com/RUB-NDS/TLS-Padding-Oracles …
    07:41 - 26. velj 2019.
    • 28 proslijeđenih tweetova
    • 58 oznaka „sviđa mi se”
    • derek wolf Michael P. Doug Rathbone pahudnet Ben Chung Dov Murik Patrick in DUB George V. Reilly Marco Garofalo
    1 reply 28 proslijeđenih tweetova 58 korisnika označava da im se sviđa
      1. Novi razgovor
      2. Colm MacCárthaigh‏ @colmmacc 26. velj 2019.
        • Prijavi Tweet

        Reassuring standard practice tweet: if you're using AWS services or AWS to terminate TLS/SSL you don't need to do anything. Amazon s2n, our Open Source implementation of TLS, was not impacted (more about why later).

        1 reply 0 proslijeđenih tweetova 4 korisnika označavaju da im se sviđa
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      3. Colm MacCárthaigh‏ @colmmacc 26. velj 2019.
        • Prijavi Tweet

        If you're using OpenSSL OpenSSL 1.0.x on your own instances, you're probably still not impacted, and if you are the risk is low, but go ahead and upgrade to OpenSSL 1.0.2r anyway! It was released this morning. O.k. story ...

        3 proslijeđena tweeta 4 korisnika označavaju da im se sviđa
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      4. Colm MacCárthaigh‏ @colmmacc 26. velj 2019.
        • Prijavi Tweet

        Juraj, Robert, Nimrod built a scanning tool that scans the internet for padding oracles. TLS supports a number of ciphers suites, and the older CBC ones encrypt in fixed size blocks. If the data you're sending doesn't add up to a whole block size, some padding is added.

        1 reply 2 proslijeđena tweeta 6 korisnika označava da im se sviđa
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      5. Colm MacCárthaigh‏ @colmmacc 26. velj 2019.
        • Prijavi Tweet

        When a CBC record comes in, it can be malformed in 2 ways: the padding can be wrong, or the signature (aka the MAC) can be wrong. Because the TLS design got the order of padding and MACs the wrong way around, it's important that implementations don't reveal which is wrong.

        1 reply 1 proslijeđeni tweet 3 korisnika označavaju da im se sviđa
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      6. Colm MacCárthaigh‏ @colmmacc 26. velj 2019.
        • Prijavi Tweet

        If implementations do, this is called a padding oracle attack, and if an attacker can get an implementation to encrypt the same data repeatedly, and also modify the encrypted traffic, and also observe the difference, eventually they would be able to decrypt the data. Sounds bad!

        1 reply 1 proslijeđeni tweet 7 korisnika označava da im se sviđa
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      7. Colm MacCárthaigh‏ @colmmacc 26. velj 2019.
        • Prijavi Tweet

        So the scanning tool does something simple: it negotiates a CBC cipher suite, and makes a connection with a bad MAC and a connection with bad padding and looks for any difference. This is my favorite kind of science: actually go check the real world!

        1 reply 0 proslijeđenih tweetova 2 korisnika označavaju da im se sviđa
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      8. Colm MacCárthaigh‏ @colmmacc 26. velj 2019.
        • Prijavi Tweet

        Not to brag, but AWS is popular. Scan us and you'll find literally millions of IPs that are terminating TLS/SSL, mostly on behalf of customers for their web applications, web services, and websites. Out of these, the scanning tool found at least 100s that showed differences.

        1 reply 0 proslijeđenih tweetova 2 korisnika označavaju da im se sviđa
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      9. Colm MacCárthaigh‏ @colmmacc 26. velj 2019.
        • Prijavi Tweet

        In the report we got, it was a "strange" list: customer IPs running unknown software, load balancers that were in FIPS mode, load balancers running on old hardware, there didn't seem to be much in common.

        1 reply 0 proslijeđenih tweetova 4 korisnika označavaju da im se sviđa
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      10. Colm MacCárthaigh‏ @colmmacc 26. velj 2019.
        • Prijavi Tweet

        We also have our own tests and monitoring for padding oracles. You can see s2n's here: https://github.com/awslabs/s2n/blob/master/tests/unit/s2n_cbc_verify_test.c … , and re-running these checks would actually show no impact. Head-scratcher!

        1 reply 0 proslijeđenih tweetova 2 korisnika označavaju da im se sviđa
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      11. Colm MacCárthaigh‏ @colmmacc 26. velj 2019.
        • Prijavi Tweet

        Colm MacCárthaigh je proslijedio/a tweet korisnika/cejuraj somorovsky

        At this point Steven Collison and Andrew Hourselt from our TLS/SSL team started having to dive really deep to find out what was going on.https://twitter.com/jurajsomorovsky/status/1100420753256841218 …

        Colm MacCárthaigh je dodan/na,

        juraj somorovsky @jurajsomorovsky
        Reporting the OpenSSL bug would not be possible without @colmmacc and his colleagues. We just reported an invalid behavior, they performed all the hard analyses (https://twitter.com/ic0nz1/status/1100413895141773312 …). Unfortunately, not all security teams are so collaborative
        1 reply 0 proslijeđenih tweetova 5 korisnika označava da im se sviđa
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      12. Colm MacCárthaigh‏ @colmmacc 26. velj 2019.
        • Prijavi Tweet

        First we were able to determine that most of the IPs were using OpenSSL to terminate traffic. But it wasn't always impacted. In fact the really common OpenSSL users, software like nginx, Apache ... not impacted at all!

        1 reply 1 proslijeđeni tweet 1 korisnik označava da mu se sviđa
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      13. Colm MacCárthaigh‏ @colmmacc 26. velj 2019.
        • Prijavi Tweet

        Tracing through the code of things that were impacted showed that the problem only happened when the application called SSL_shutdown() twice, even if there is a protocol error.

        1 reply 0 proslijeđenih tweetova 2 korisnika označavaju da im se sviđa
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      14. Colm MacCárthaigh‏ @colmmacc 26. velj 2019.
        • Prijavi Tweet

        Calling SSL_shutdown() twice is normal when there's no problem with a connection, and it should be harmless in the error case, so it's understandable that some applications do it ... but thankfully it's not common.

        1 reply 0 proslijeđenih tweetova 1 korisnik označava da mu se sviđa
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      15. Colm MacCárthaigh‏ @colmmacc 26. velj 2019.
        • Prijavi Tweet

        The actual leak of info, whether it was a padding or MAC error, would effectively show up as a timing or connection close difference between these calls. Impacted applications would either seem to time out, or close connections, differently, depending on the error. Subtle.

        1 reply 0 proslijeđenih tweetova 4 korisnika označavaju da im se sviđa
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      16. Colm MacCárthaigh‏ @colmmacc 26. velj 2019.
        • Prijavi Tweet

        O.k. so next question: why don't existing padding oracle tests find this? Well it turns out only to happen to zero byte records. Records that have no data in them. And the scanning tool happens to send zero byte records.

        1 reply 0 proslijeđenih tweetova 2 korisnika označavaju da im se sviđa
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      17. Colm MacCárthaigh‏ @colmmacc 26. velj 2019.
        • Prijavi Tweet

        Zero-byte records aren't common: browsers don't send them afaict, and packet dumps seem to show that they are exceedingly rare: which makes sense, if you have no data to send, why would bother? So that's very re-assuring.

        1 reply 1 proslijeđeni tweet 2 korisnika označavaju da im se sviđa
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      18. Colm MacCárthaigh‏ @colmmacc 26. velj 2019.
        • Prijavi Tweet

        Next weird thing: the problem also happened if OpenSSL wasn't using AES-NI hardware acceleration. In practice this means it impacted 3DES (which people should have turned off for other reasons!) and older hardware.

        1 reply 1 proslijeđeni tweet 3 korisnika označavaju da im se sviđa
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      19. Colm MacCárthaigh‏ @colmmacc 26. velj 2019.
        • Prijavi Tweet

        This also explained why FIPS software appeared in the list, because FIPS software generally can't use AES-NI.

        1 reply 0 proslijeđenih tweetova 2 korisnika označavaju da im se sviđa
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      20. Colm MacCárthaigh‏ @colmmacc 26. velj 2019.
        • Prijavi Tweet

        At this point, a lot of factors have to be combined: TLS sw would have to be coded in an uncommon way, using OpenSSL, negotiating older cipher suites, on older HW, with clients that send 0-byte records, and can be made repeat the same data over and over, with an active MITM.

        1 proslijeđeni tweet 2 korisnika označavaju da im se sviđa
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      21. Colm MacCárthaigh‏ @colmmacc 26. velj 2019.
        • Prijavi Tweet

        But that makes it more interesting! How do we find and prevent even these kind of rarefied cases? Automation, like the scanning tool, is clearly critical - but can we do more at the point of code?

        1 reply 0 proslijeđenih tweetova 3 korisnika označavaju da im se sviđa
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      22. Colm MacCárthaigh‏ @colmmacc 26. velj 2019.
        • Prijavi Tweet

        One thing I'm grateful for is that in s2n we kill connections on any error, and we do it in a way where s2n will completely refuse to interact with the connection after the error has happened. Just with a closed flag ...https://github.com/awslabs/s2n/blob/master/tls/s2n_connection.c#L1031 …

        1 proslijeđeni tweet 1 korisnik označava da mu se sviđa
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      23. Colm MacCárthaigh‏ @colmmacc 26. velj 2019.
        • Prijavi Tweet

        s2n uses OpenSSL's libcrypto for the underlying cryptography, and the same issue in that code /could/ have caused impact within s2n were it not for that practice. Basically this check ....https://github.com/awslabs/s2n/blob/master/tls/s2n_send.c#L94 …

        1 reply 0 proslijeđenih tweetova 1 korisnik označava da mu se sviđa
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      24. Colm MacCárthaigh‏ @colmmacc 26. velj 2019.
        • Prijavi Tweet

        Of course the impact still would have been small, because of the other factors, but I'm glad we have that check! Anyway, thanks again to the issue reporters, read their paper when it comes! and thanks for Andrew and Steven from the TLS team. That's it, unless AMA.

        1 reply 0 proslijeđenih tweetova 5 korisnika označava da im se sviđa
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      25. Colm MacCárthaigh‏ @colmmacc 26. velj 2019.
        • Prijavi Tweet

        Colm MacCárthaigh je proslijedio/a tweet korisnika/ceRobert Merget

        Quick addendum:https://twitter.com/ic0nz1/status/1100432621149003783 …

        Colm MacCárthaigh je dodan/na,

        Robert Merget @ic0nz1
        Odgovor korisniku/ci @colmmacc
        actually you do not need clients which send 0-byte records. An Attacker can cut the record (adjust the iv) and adjust the length of the record header. This way a normal record appears to the server as zero length with an invalid mac, although the original record was way longer
        1 proslijeđeni tweet 3 korisnika označavaju da im se sviđa
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