Take it from me that you don't want a trusted service responsible for your AAA stack also parsing X.509 and ASN.1. Nuts nuts nuts.
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Enter an MTLS infrastructure and you have to cross your fingers that they are even logging the user's names. NIGHTMARE to debug.
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And for authz the admins get "creative". Because certs basically encode strings, people start using them as arbitrary bearer tokens. Let's put group permissions in the cert itself, encoded in strings ... and then do access control with ... REGEXes!!
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ACTUAL SECURITY ISSUE I SAW IN THE WILD: The "administrative-assistants" has root-level access to everything for years, because their group name started with "admin" and the regex letting them in lacked a $ terminator!!
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Disclaimer: they were using Apache 2.0, and I wrote that regex supporting madness, and so it is my fault and I will pay for my sins.
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Anyway, back to MTLS, it is a hodgepodge of awfulness. Massive code base to implement, terrible standards in the middle, and just obscure untested garbage left and right. RUN AWAY!
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Yet it gets a reputation for being a best practice, maybe because it's hard, or because it has a halo from the false talisman of cryptography. *shudder* BAD, BAD, TERRIBAD.
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Anyway, that's the rant out of my system! AMA about MTLS if you want, and dear
@Unrollme - please unroll this thread.Show this thread
End of conversation
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