Centre for Internet and SocietyVerifisert konto

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The entirety of our analysis, as well as our recommendations on changes can be made to develop a comprehensive regulatory framework for #FRT, was done with support from @HRBDTNews, and can be found at: https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/hrbdt-and-cis-august-31-2021-facial-recognition-technology-in-india …

There is also a need to increase the capacity building and training of agencies and entities involved in the deployment of #FRT.

There is a need for greater public discourse on issues, such as on the implications and appropriate use of FRT by different actors, including law enforcement, public sector entities, private entities, and the public.

Given past surveillance projects, practices by the State, and emerging uses of #FRT by law enforcement, there is a need for a clear regulatory framework, which defines the acceptable uses of FRT and the necessary safeguards.

Drawing on insights from the UK, EU, and USA, we see that many jurisdictions have currently issued moratoriums on the use of #FRT in public spaces in the absence of clear guidelines, with the EU even considering a ban on the technology altogether.

Discussions surrounding #FRT within the legislature have been reactionary as opposed to proactive, with the executive taking most of the initiative in the conceptualisation, and implementation of FRT in India.

An analysis of questions posed in Parliament sessions shows that, as of July 2021, there has been no discussion in Parliament on the #ArtificialRecognitionSystem and only one question has been asked about it.

Furthermore, India’s wider surveillance regime lacks judicial authorization, places heavy-handed penalties for non-compliance, prohibits transparency, lacks key safeguards, and establishes varying grounds and conditions for surveillance - all of which open up FRT for misuse.

Due to the absence of any overarching #FRT or legislation, there is an immense variance pertaining to the scope, data use, and applicability of FRT systems across states, and police departments, which can lead to issues of improper use and rights violations.

We find that in the absence of a dedicated FRT (or #PersonalDataProtection) legislation, the use of FRT is not expressly mandated by any pre-existing laws. Furthermore, its use is not in conformity with the principles of legitimate state aim and proportionality.

In the #Puttaswamy judgment, the Supreme Court laid out a three-fold test for determining legitimate restrictions to the #RightToPrivacy. These are (i) existence of a law; (ii) legitimate state aim; and (iii) proportionality

FRT is being used across a number of central and state government bodies, with the stated focus being improving surveillance, preventing crime, and ensuring safety. However, questions persist over its efficacy in achieving this and its encroachment into individual rights.