Christo GrozevVerified account

In addition Dutch IT forensic experts conducted on-the-ground network experiments in Ukraine and compared it to the metadata obtained from Ukrainian mobile operators.

Although incomplete and delayed by a year, the network measurement data provided valuable data to both validate telecom data and to identify the location of people speaking. Care was always taken not to jump to conclusions due to distance b/n cell tower and telephone, etc.

The network connection data was used as additional, and not as primary source of data, to validate other findings (such as discussion of a movement of a suspect, or a visual sighting).

Dutch telecoms experts with large forensic experience analyzed the comprehensive Ukraine-provided data and concluded that its integrity is the same as would be expected in any Dutch investigation.

Whenever any Ukrainian intercept included an international call, JIT retreived the corresponding call metadata (or audio) from the other (Polish, Spanish etc) mobile operator. All such cross-checked matched.

JIT and journalists also confronted other persons of interests who claimed that they did speak the content that was heard on intercepts, but on a different date. Dubinsky was one example. However data from such other date showed no such calls were made or possible.

In summary, JIT conducted a holistic, multidisciplinary validation of all calls shared by Ukraine, and have concluded that it's implausible that any manipulation of the handed-over call data may have taken place.

Prosecutors describe how they searched for witnesses. The first way was by using tips provided by SBU from ongoing investigations. Second were other countries that provided access to witnesses. Third, repeated appeal for witnesses were made by JIT via web, radio ads etc.

JIT also targeted individual potential witnesses via DM's, phone calls and social media. Many of these targeted individuals referred JIT to other people who might have had more information. This approach led to dozens of witness statements both in and out of Eastern Ukraine

These witnesses include former Russian mercenaries, Donbass separatists, journalists, local residents. Some of them were and/or are in Russia. We took their security as our primary goal.

Witness came forward between 2014 and 2019, and in 2019 the investigative judge started hearing each witness, and studied their individual safety situation to approve or not their anonymization. The judge also independently assessed the credibility of such witnesses.

Per Dutch law, an indicted party may challenge the anonymization of witnesses. In this case Pulatov challenged the anonymization of all secured witnesses, and a separate review court accepted that for one of them the procedure was not followed properly. All others remain anon.

JIT now will discuss the gathering of video and photo evidence, as well as the digital open source investigations, including the private investigations by journalists and citizen investigators.

Prosecutors explain the mammoth work that needed to be undertaken to monitor, capture and archive ALL potentially relevant online posts, images, video publications that might in the future provide evidence. This was done on a mass-scale basis using ML algorithms.

Initially only purely openly accessible sites were monitored and scraped. Later, JIT decided to create passive accounts to access membership status to certain closed online groups to be able to collected shared data therein. JIT obtained court-approved decisions for such access.